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Essay 
Representative Government, 
Representative Court? The Supreme 
Court as a Representative Body 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig† 
Central to our country’s idea of fairness within the court 
system is the notion of the completely neutral arbiter.1 The ar-
chetype adjudicator remains uninfluenced by sources outside 
the law (which itself is not free from human failings) and is en-
tirely free of bias. Yet, as Judge Jerome Frank once declared, 
we are well aware that a person does not “cease[] to be human 
and strip[] himself [or herself] of all predilections” or “become[] 
a passionless thinking machine” simply “by putting on a black 
robe and taking the oath of office as a judge.”2 At a minimum, 
we recognize the humanness of judges through concepts such as 
recusal, which “recognize that judges will, from time to time, 
have biases, prejudices, or interests that prevent truly unbi-
ased decision-making.”3 
 
†  Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. E-mail:  
aonwuachi@ucdavis.edu. J.D., University of Michigan Law School; B.A., Grin-
nell College. Thanks to Chris Elmendorf, Kevin Johnson, Carlton Larson, Eve-
lyn Lewis, Daria Roithmayr, Madhavi Sunder, and Marty West for their help-
ful comments and support and to Dean Rex Perschbacher for his generous 
support. My research assistant Andrea Fazel and the staff of the U.C. Davis 
Law Library, especially Erin Murphy, provided valuable assistance. This Es-
say gained much from comments from the Symposium participants, editors, 
and audience members. Most importantly, I thank my husband Jacob and my 
children, Elijah and Bethany, for their constant love and support. 
 1. Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 
657, 661 (2005). 
 2. In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 652–53 (2d Cir. 1943). 
 3. Bassett, supra note 1, at 658; see also id. at 661 (describing the vari-
ous ways in which bias can arise, including financial interest, favored rela-
tionships, and personal bias); Karen Nelson Moore, Appellate Review of Judi-
cial Disqualification Decisions in the Federal Courts, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 
830–37 (1984) (describing situations that may warrant judicial disqualifica-
tion). 
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The fact is that background—or to put it differently, diver-
sity—matters on judicial bodies. As Chief Judge Harry Ed-
wards of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ex-
plained, “[I]t is inevitable that judges’ different professional 
and life experiences have some bearing on how they confront 
various problems that come before them.”4 Thus, judges of all 
backgrounds bring their own human experience to the bench.5 
For this reason, it is important (as Professors Kevin Johnson, 
Sherrilyn Ifill, and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer have argued) that 
courts, especially the Supreme Court, are comprised of indi-
viduals who represent a cross section of the country—
individuals with differing views that are undeniably influenced 
by life experience.6 
This question of demographic representation on the Su-
preme Court was raised again most recently when President 
George W. Bush initially nominated John Roberts to replace 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor,7 the first woman to be appointed 
to the Court and, at the time, one of only two women on the 
nine-Justice Court.8 Many, including First Lady Laura Bush,  
 
 
 
 4. Harry T. Edwards, Race and the Judiciary, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
325, 329 (2002); see also Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
1, 3 (1994) (asserting that “all judges, as part of basic human functioning, 
bring to each decision a package of personal biases and beliefs that may un-
consciously and unintentionally affect the decisionmaking process”). 
 5. See Edward M. Chen, The Judiciary, Diversity, and Justice for All, 10 
ASIAN L.J. 127, 136–38 (2003) (describing how one judge’s childhood experi-
ence of watching his grandfather be humiliated because of limited English-
speaking skills informed that judge’s understanding of language discrimina-
tion). 
 6. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartial-
ity, and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 124–27 
(1997) (asserting that racial minorities could seek to compel states to adopt 
affirmative action judicial selection plans); Kevin R. Johnson & Luis Fuentes-
Rohwer, A Principled Approach to the Quest for Racial Diversity on the Judici-
ary, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 5, 6, 10 (2004) (analogizing judges to juries and ar-
guing that, much like with diversity of juries, “pulling a group of judges from a 
cross-section of the community would . . . benefit the decision-making proc-
ess”). 
 7. See Elisabeth Bumiller, As All Washington Guessed, Bush Zeroed In 
on His Choice, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2005, at A16. 
 8. WILLIAM D. BADER & ROY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED 
EIGHT JUSTICES 14 (2004) (noting that Justice O’Connor was sworn in as the 
first female Justice after a confirmation vote of 99 to 0 and that Justice Gins-
burg was sworn in as the second female Justice to join O’Connor after a con-
firmation vote of 97 to 3). 
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hoped that the President would appoint a woman to take Jus-
tice O’Connor’s seat.9 
The stakes were high, apart from mere representation. 
Liberals worried that a male Justice, especially one with con-
servative credentials, would not bring the same distinctive fe-
male, or rather minority, voice that a conservative Justice 
O’Connor brought to important issues, such as abortion rights10 
and affirmative action.11 Conservatives struggled with the po-
tentially damaging political consequences of not naming a 
woman to the high court when 60 percent of all Americans be-
lieved that appointing a woman was important.12 Even Justice 
O’Connor remarked, while noting that Roberts himself is “first-
rate,”13 that she was, “disappointed to see the percentage of 
women on our court drop by 50 percent.”14 Many others agreed 
that “something is lost when there is only one female voice in 
the room.”15 As Karen O’Connor, director of Women and Poli-
 
 9. See Mike Dorning & Andrew Martin, Nomination Vexes Liberals, 
Women: Loss of 2nd Female Voice Is Seen as Cause for Concern, CHI. TRIB., 
July 21, 2005, at C1. Besides the First Lady urging the President to replace 
O’Connor with a woman, other Republican women acknowledged the need for 
more women on the Supreme Court. For instance, Republican Senator Olym-
pia Snowe stated that “it would have been preferable to replace Sandra Day 
O’Connor with a qualified, capable woman,” and Republican Senator Susan 
Collins declared that, after Roberts’s nomination, “[s]he would like to see more 
women on the Supreme Court.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Fur-
ther, Professor Marci Hamilton, a former O’Connor clerk, asserted: “The hope 
was that this wasn’t a one-seat quota, that the number of women on the court 
would expand.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 10. See David Stout & Elisabeth Bumiller, President’s Choice of Roberts 
Ends a Day of Speculation, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2005, http://www.nytimes 
.com/2005/07/19/politics/politicsspecial1/19cnd-judge.html (quoting a spokes-
person at NARAL as stating: “If Roberts is confirmed to a lifetime appoint-
ment, there is little doubt that he will work to overturn Roe v. Wade”). 
 11. Former Justice O’Connor wrote the opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306 (2003), which upheld the constitutionality of the University of 
Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program. Id. at 343. 
 12. Susan Estrich, Lack of Diversity on Supreme Court, NEWSMAX.COM, 
July 24, 2005, http://newsmax.com/archives/articles/2005/7/23/170018.shtml 
(noting that 65 percent of Americans believed that it would be a good idea to 
appoint a woman); Poll: Supreme Court Pick Matters, CBS NEWS, July 15, 
2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/07/15/opinion/polls/main709505 
.shtml (“Women are more likely than men to say it is very important to them 
that a woman replaces O’Connor; 36 percent of women feel this way, compared 
to just 13 percent of men.”).  
 13. Dorning & Martin, supra note 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 14. Estrich, supra note 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 15. Dorning & Martin, supra note 9. Justice O’Connor once said to the 
1996 Women’s Olympic Basketball Team, which visited the Supreme Court, “I 
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tics at American University explained, “While one woman can 
make the argument when it comes to sex discrimination, Title 
IX, [equal educational opportunities], [and] reproductive pri-
vacy, a second woman in the room helps solidify the positions 
and makes the men understand some of the ramifications.”16 
When Chief Justice Rehnquist passed away and Roberts 
was nominated to fill the position of Chief Justice, the issue of 
representation became an even stronger topic. Unlike replacing 
Justice O’Connor with Roberts, the replacement of Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist by the same candidate was perceived as non-
controversial, with one white male conservative replacing an-
other. However, the pressure was on again for President Bush 
to nominate a candidate who could bring a different voice than 
that of Roberts, specifically another female Justice or a Justice 
of color.17 The rationale behind these demands was that the 
Court, although not directly, is a representative body, and the 
most effective way of providing a broad range of voices on the 
most powerful judicial institution in the country is to ensure 
that people of all backgrounds—race, sex, class, religion, sexu-
ality—are actually represented on the Court. 
On October 3, 2005, President Bush responded to pressures 
concerning the gender and/or racial background of the next po-
tential Justice by nominating Harriet Ellan Miers, White 
House counsel and his former personal attorney.18 Noting that 
Miers would bring a distinctive perspective to the bench while 
strictly interpreting the Constitution, President Bush defended 
Miers as the right choice for the seat.19 Others also noted the 
unique viewpoints that Miers, a woman, could bring to the 
Court. For example, Professor Linda Eads of Southern Method-
ist University Law School explained that while Miers “doesn’t 
 
can’t tell you how happy I was when she [Justice Ginsburg] got to the court. It 
makes a night and day difference to have women on the bench.” William C. 
Rhoden, A Mission Is Reaffirmed in the Nation’s Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 
1995, at B23 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 16. Dorning & Martin, supra note 9 (first alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 17. Elisabeth Bumiller et al., Bush Names Counsel as Choice for Supreme 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005, at A1 (“Mr. Bush had been under pressure 
from interest groups to appoint a woman . . . .”); Michael A. Fletcher & Dan 
Balz, Bush Faces Pressure to Diversify Supreme Court, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 
2005, at A4 (noting that “[a] number of Latino group officials have publicly 
urged the president to name the first Hispanic to the high court”). 
 18. Michael Fletcher, White House Counsel Miers Chosen for Court, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 5, 2005, at A1. 
 19. Id. 
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wear her experiences on her sleeve,” the experience of trying to 
find legal employment as a woman “affected her and she has to 
know . . . that not all groups are always treated equally.”20 
Miers’s nomination to the Court, however, was intensely 
challenged by conservatives who questioned her record on con-
stitutional law issues and felt that her nomination was pure 
cronyism.21 On October 27, 2005, Miers quietly withdrew her 
nomination for the Court, citing her refusal to release privi-
leged documents concerning her work as the President’s chief 
counsel as the reason for her withdrawal.22 
Although First Lady Laura Bush continued to urge the 
President to nominate a woman,23 the President instead nomi-
nated Samuel Alito,24 a decision that essentially ensured that 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg would soon become the only 
woman sitting on the Court. President Bush’s decision to nomi-
nate a man for a second time to replace Justice O’Connor did 
not receive nearly as much attention as his first selection.25 
However, many politicians and activists continued to comment 
on how the President’s third choice to replace Justice O’Connor 
 
 20. Todd S. Purdum & Neil A. Lewis, Hard-Working Advocate for the 
President, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 21. Ron Fournier, Bush Goes Right for Next Nominee, GRAND RAPIDS 
PRESS, Oct. 31, 2005, at A1, available at 2005 WLNR 17778861 (“Miers bowed 
out Thursday after three weeks of bruising criticism from members of Bush’s 
own party, who argued the Texas lawyer and loyal Bush confidant had thin 
credentials on constitutional law and no proven record as a judicial conserva-
tive.”); see also Randy E. Barnett, Cronyism, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2005, at A26 
(“Harriet Miers is not just the close confidante of the president in her capacity 
as his staff secretary and then as White House counsel. She also was George 
W. Bush’s personal lawyer. Apart from nominating his brother or former busi-
ness partner, it is hard to see how the president could have selected someone 
who fit Hamilton’s description any more closely.”) Some questioned whether 
gender played a role in conservative opposition to Miers. Senator Diane Fein-
stein remarked, “I don’t believe they would have attacked a man the way she 
was attacked . . . . I don’t think she deserves the treatment she got.” Edward 
Epstein, Miers Withdraws as Court Nominee, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 28, 2005, at 
A1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 22. Epstein, supra note 21. 
 23. Peter Baker, Alito Nomination Sets Stage for Ideological Battle, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2005, at A1. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Although the President chose a man to replace Justice O’Connor, his 
selection of Alito did not result in any immediate political damage to the party 
or the nomination, with 54 percent of Americans in December, 2005, agreeing 
that the Senate should confirm Alito. Jon Cohen, Poll: Majority Wants Alito on 
Supreme Court, ABCNEWS.COM, Dec. 21, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/ 
print?id=1426504. 
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reflected a lack of commitment to diversity on the Court. For 
instance, Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid proclaimed, “This 
appointment ignores the value of diverse backgrounds and per-
spectives.”26 According to Senator Reid, “President Bush would 
leave the Supreme Court looking less like America and more 
like an old boys club.”27 Again, much like with President Bush’s 
first selection of now Chief Justice Roberts to replace a retiring 
Justice O’Connor, the decision to fill her seat with Alito would 
result in replacing a moderate, who was often the swing vote on 
issues such as affirmative action and abortion (both issues that 
significantly affect women), with a conservative, white male 
judge.28  
This idea of filling a vacancy left by Justice O’Connor with 
a man was even a concern for some conservative activists, who 
had expressed a preference for the President to nominate a 
woman for the position.29 For example, although the vast ma-
jority of conservative activists indicated that neither race nor 
sex should matter in the President’s selection,30 others such as 
Traditional Values Coalition Chairman Louis P. Sheldon as-
serted the following: “I think we should have a woman this 
time . . . . Isn’t the [Justice] retiring a woman?”31 In sum, many 
agreed with Justice O’Connor, who argued before the nomina-
tion of Alito: “Women constitute one half of the population in 
this country. It is critical for women to serve in all branches of 
government.”32 
 
 
 26. Bush Nominates Alito to Supreme Court: Conservatives, Liberals 
Ready for Heated Debate, CNN.COM, Oct. 31, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/ 
POLITICS/10/31/scotus.bush/index.html (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 27. Baker, supra note 23 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 28. Liza Porteus, Bush Taps Alito for Supreme Court, FOXNEWS.COM, 
Nov. 1, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,173968,00.html. 
 29. Conservatives Look Past Miers: Leaders Say They Want Justice with 
Clear Conservative Views, CNN.COM, Oct. 28, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/ 
POLITICS/10/28/scotus.next/index.html. 
 30. Lanier Swann, the director of government relations for Concerned 
Women for America declared, “For us it is not about sex, race or creed . . . . It 
is really about their ability to fairly interpret the Constitution.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted) 
 31. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Sheldon 
then identified Edith Jones, Priscilla Owen, and Janice Rogers Brown as po-
tential choices to replace O’Connor. Id. 
 32. Supreme Court Watch Resumes, CBSNEWS.COM, Oct. 30, 2005, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/10/28/supremecourt/main989993.shtml 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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This Essay contends, quite simply, that diversity matters 
on the Court and that the Court should be a demographically 
representative body of the citizens of the United States. There-
after, building on this notion that diversity is critical to the per-
formance of the Court in its deliberations on cases, this Essay 
then proposes, as a thinking point, that the number of Supreme 
Court Justices be expanded to increase the representation of 
various demographic groups and ensure proper representation 
of all voices on the most powerful judicial body of our nation. 
I.  WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A WISE  
OLD MAN AND A WISE OLD WOMAN? 
 “A system of justice is the richer for the diversity of back-
ground and experience of its participants. It is the poorer, in 
terms of evaluating what is at stake and the impact of its judg-
ments, if its members—its lawyers, jurors, and judges—are all 
cast from the same mold.” 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg33 
Under our system of government, elected officials in the 
legislative and executive braches are to provide adequate po-
litical representation for their constituents. On the other hand, 
the federal judiciary, which is composed of individuals ap-
pointed by our President, is not viewed as a representative 
body. Instead, the federal judiciary, although appointed to the 
bench and voted on by elected officials, is set up to be free from 
outside pressures in performing its duties and is to provide a 
check on, and balance against, other branches of government. 
Given the power and influence of the federal judiciary, in 
particular the Supreme Court, the question is whether that 
check itself should be checked by a demographically represen-
tative cross section of the United States. In other words, in 
what ways should the judiciary, although not directly, be 
viewed as representative body of the people? 
Judge Richard Posner has maintained, 
The nation contains such a diversity of moral and political thinking 
that the judiciary, if it is to retain its effectiveness, its legitimacy, has 
to be heterogeneous; . . . and the members of a heterogeneous judicial 
community are not going to subscribe to a common set of moral and  
 
 
 
 33. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Supreme Court: A Place for Women, 32 SW. 
U. L. REV. 189, 190 (2003). 
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political dogmas that would make their decisionmaking determi-
nate.34 
At the present moment, however, our federal judiciary does not 
reflect the rich racial, ethnic, and gender diversity of our na-
tion. For example, as Magistrate Judge Edward Chen of the 
Northern District of California, the first Asian Pacific American 
to be named to the federal bench in that district, has asserted, 
the federal bench is incredibly lacking in racial diversity.35 As 
of September 30, 2001, out of nearly 1600 active federal judges, 
including Article III, magistrate, bankruptcy, and court of 
claims judges, only 7.2 percent were Blacks, 4.0 percent were 
Latino/as, 0.8 percent were Asian-Americans, and 0.1 percent 
were American Indians, while Blacks, Latinos, Asian-
Americans, and American Indians respectively constituted 
12.3, 12.5, 3.7, and 0.9 percent of the population in the United 
States.36 Further, even though women comprise at least half 
the population, in 2005, they only held roughly a quarter of all 
federal judgeships.37 
The Supreme Court, given its size, is arguably more di-
verse than the lower federal courts with respect to racial diver-
sity. Of its nine Justices, one is a black male, Justice Clarence 
Thomas, making racial minorities 11 percent of the Court. 
With respect to other factors such as education, class, and 
even religion, the Supreme Court, however, is less diverse. All 
nine of the Justices on the Court graduated from elite law 
schools, which in itself placed them in a select category of law-
yers who had their choice of jobs early on in their careers, with 
the exception of Justices Ginsburg and Thomas, who had diffi-
culty finding jobs after law school because of their sex and race, 
respectively.38 All of the Justices, except for Justices Ginsburg 
 
 34. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 94 (2003); 
see also Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Does a Diverse Judiciary Attain a Rule of Law 
That Is Inclusive? What Grutter v. Bollinger Has to Say About Diversity on the 
Bench, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 101, 106–07 (2004) (asserting that “constitu-
tional judgments are visibly biased when the Supreme Court or other courts 
selectively strip out social and racial context to conform with the identity-
based views of the majority”). 
 35. Chen, supra note 5, at 128–29. 
 36. Id. at 129; see also Elizabeth A. Kronk, Hundreds of Nations, Millions 
of People: One Senior Judge on the Federal Bench, FED. LAW., July 2005, at 16, 
16 (discussing the consequences of having no active American Indian judges 
on the federal bench).  
 37. Marcia Coyle, Justices Diversity Pool Too Shallow?, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 
26, 2005, at 1. 
 38. Justice Ginsburg experienced discrimination when she sought em-
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and Thomas, grew up in comfortably middle- to upper-class 
families.39 Five of the nine Justices are Catholic, with the re-
mainder of the Court consisting of only two Jews, one Protes-
tant, and an Episcopalian.40 None of the Justices are openly 
gay, and none of them are of Latino, Asian American, or Native 
American descent. Yet, the Justices on the Supreme Court are 
left with the task and enormous responsibility of interpreting 
the Constitution and laws of the nation for the entire rich di-
versity of people who reside in the United States. 
One may ask, “If the law is simply the law, why does this 
issue of representation on the Court even matter?” After all, as 
former Minnesota Supreme Court Justice Mary Jeanne Coyne 
proclaimed, “[A] wise old man and a wise old woman reach the 
same conclusion.”41 
Perhaps Justice Ginsburg provided the best answer to this 
question of why it matters who sits on the Court, when she 
agreed that Justice Coyne was correct to state that a wise old 
man and woman do reach the same decision, but declared: “[I]t 
is also true that women, like persons of different racial groups 
and ethnic origins, contribute to the United States judiciary 
 
ployment after graduation from law school. Despite her excellent credentials, 
Ginsburg “received no job offers from New York law firms” and was not “able 
to obtain a clerkship interview with a Supreme Court Justice.” SUPREME HIS-
TORICAL SOC’Y, THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES 
1789–1995, at 532 (Clare Cushman ed., 1995). Ultimately, District Court 
Judge Edmund L. Palmieri hired Ginsburg as his law clerk. Id. Justice Tho-
mas also experienced racial discrimination upon his graduation from Yale Law 
School when he was rejected by every law firm in Atlanta. Angela Onwuachi-
Willig, Just Another Brother on the SCT?: What Justice Clarence Thomas 
Teaches Us About the Influence of Racial Identity, 90 IOWA L. REV. 931, 970–
71 (2005). Like Justices Ginsburg and Thomas, retired Justice O’Connor also 
experienced severe employment discrimination after law school. Even though 
O’Connor graduated at the top of her class at Stanford Law School, “no private 
firm would hire her to do a lawyer’s work” after graduation. Ruth Bader Gins-
burg, Remarks on Women’s Progress in the Legal Profession in the United 
States, 33 TULSA L.J. 13, 14 (1997) (quoting O’Connor as saying, “I interviewed 
with law firms in Los Angeles and San Francisco, . . . but none had ever hired 
a woman before as a lawyer, and they were not prepared to do so” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The 
Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1219 (1992) (describing the 
gender discrimination she experienced “when law firms would only hire [her], 
a ‘lady lawyer,’ as a legal secretary”). 
 39. Cf. Paul Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 664 (1985) (as-
serting that federal judges “are overwhelmingly Anglo, male, well educated 
and upper or upper middle class”). 
 40. See Baker, supra note 23. 
 41. Ginsburg, supra note 33, at 189 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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what . . . [is] fittingly called ‘a distinctive medley of views influ-
enced by differences in biology, cultural impact, and life experi-
ence.’”42 The fact is that one’s background, while it may not de-
termine one’s vote, may affect how one approaches and 
perceives the issues in a case.43 This effect of background on 
decision making even applies to majority judges, who because 
of the way society is structured with them at the center as the 
norm, are often viewed as being neutral, objective, and unaf-
fected by their background.44 In other words, while Justices 
and judges of different backgrounds—whether a wise old man 
or a wise old woman—may often reach the same conclusion, the 
idea of complete neutrality on the bench is a myth. 
One good example of how the jurisprudence of a Justice 
may be influenced by her background, specifically her gender, 
is Justice O’Connor’s jurisprudence on discrimination, the Es-
tablishment Clause, the right to abortion, and affirmative ac-
tion.45 Professor Suzanna Sherry hinted that Justice 
 
 42. Id. (quoting the late Alvin B. Rubin, former judge of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit); see also Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 6, 
at 6 (“Virtually every legal actor understands that a judge’s biases, perspec-
tives, and life experiences influence judicial decision-making.”). 
 43. See Lazos Vargas, supra note 34, at 134 (noting, for example, that 
“there is solid evidence that race affects judging”). 
 44. See Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transpar-
ently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2013 (1995) 
(“Thus, white people frequently interpret norms adopted by a dominantly 
white culture as racially neutral, and so fail to recognize the ways in which 
those norms may be in fact covertly race-specific.”); Barbara J. Flagg, “Was 
Blind, but Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and The Requirement of Dis-
criminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 977 (1993) (noting that “[t]he perva-
siveness of the transparency phenomenon militates against an unsupported 
faith by whites in the reality of race-neutral decisionmaking”); Berta 
Esperanza Hernández Truyol, Building Bridges—Latinas and Latinos at the 
Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric and Replacement, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 369, 372–73 (1994) (“Traditional legal thought—the purportedly objec-
tive, rational, neutral legal analysis—constituted the ‘norm,’ the aspirational 
‘neutral’ (reasonable) person: a white, formally educated, middle to upper 
class, heterosexual, physically and mentally able, Judeo-Christian, Western 
European/Anglo male.”); Sylvia A. Law, White Privilege and Affirmative Ac-
tion, 32 AKRON L. REV. 603, 604–05 (1999) (“When people are asked to de-
scribe themselves in a few words, [black] people invariably note their race and 
white people almost never do. Surveys tell us that virtually all [black] people 
notice the importance of race several times a day. White people rarely contem-
plate the fact of our whiteness—it is the norm, the given. It is a privilege to 
not have to think about race.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 45. See Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 6, at 17; Suzanna Sherry, 
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. 
REV. 543, 592–616 (1986). 
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O’Connor’s status as woman, an outsider of sorts, helps to ex-
plain “her greater willingness [than former Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, who was of similar politics] to remedy the effects of 
race discrimination and discrimination against aliens” and “her 
reluctance to accept conduct that condemns groups or individu-
als to outsider status.”46 Similarly, it is rumored that Justice 
O’Connor, often a swing vote on cases concerning affirmative 
action, declared the following in response to a tirade by Justice 
Scalia about the evils of the policy: “But, Nino, if it weren’t for 
affirmative action, I wouldn’t be here.”47  
Other Justices on the Supreme Court have been likewise 
influenced by their backgrounds in their approach to cases. As 
several Justices have noted, among the strengths that Justice 
Thurgood Marshall brought to the Supreme Court were his 
unique perspectives as a result of his life experiences with race 
and racism. For instance, Justice Brennan once proclaimed: 
“What made Thurgood Marshall unique as a Justice? Above all, 
it was the special voice that he added to the Court’s delibera-
tions and decisions. His was a voice of authority: he spoke from 
first-hand knowledge of the law’s failure to fulfill its promised 
protections for so many Americans.”48 In the same vein, the 
background of Justice Thomas, the only racial minority cur-
rently on the Court, has certainly had an impact on the devel-
opment of his jurisprudence.49 For example, Professor Mark 
 
 46. Sherry, supra note 45, at 595–96. 
 47. Oyez.org, Antonin Scalia, http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/legal_ 
entity/103/biography (last visited Apr. 8, 2006) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 48. William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 23, 23 (1991); see also Anthony M. Kennedy, The Voice of Thur-
good Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1221, 1221 (1992) (noting how Justice Mar-
shall reminded the other Justices of their “moral obligation as a people to con-
front those tragedies of the human condition which continue to haunt even the 
richest and freest of countries”); O’Connor, supra note 38, at 1217 (“Justice 
Marshall imparted not only his legal acumen but also his life experiences, con-
stantly pushing and prodding us to respond not only to the persuasiveness of 
legal argument but also to the power of moral truth.”); Byron R. White, A 
Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1215, 1216 (1992) 
(“Thurgood brought to the conference table years of experience in an area that 
was of vital importance to our work, experience that none of us could claim to 
match. . . . [H]e told us much that we did not know due to the limitations of 
our own experience.”). 
 49. See Lazos Vargas, supra note 34, at 137 (“Justice Thomas reaches his 
conclusions using both his racial experience and his belief about the permissi-
ble role of government in social interventions under the Constitution.” (foot-
notes omitted)); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 38, at 978–1000 (arguing that 
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Tushnet finds traces of black nationalism in several of Justice 
Thomas’s opinions.50 Likewise, Professor Guy-Uriel Charles 
has written about how the idea of racial authenticity has 
played a role in providing Justice Thomas with a kind of “epis-
temic authority” on certain racial issues before the Court,51 and 
I have written about the role that both race and racism have 
played in shaping Justice Thomas’s judicial philosophies as a 
black conservative.52 
As several commentators have noted, even diversity in 
work experience matters. During the candidacy of former Su-
preme Court nominee, Harriett Miers, several politicians and 
scholars highlighted her lack of experience as a judge, or rather 
her experience as an attorney in the “real world,” as a plus fac-
tor in her nomination. For instance, Senate Minority Leader 
Harry Reid stated, “I like Harriet Miers. . . . In my view, the 
Supreme Court would benefit from the addition of a justice who 
has real experience as a practicing lawyer.”53 Similarly, Profes-
sor Marci Hamilton indicated that she found Miers’s back-
ground as a player in local and state politics in Texas “crucial” 
to the Supreme Court—much in the same way that Justice 
O’Connor’s sensitivities as a result of her experience as a state 
legislator and judge were.54 
Adding a diversity of voices—whether due to background 
differences in race, gender, childhood class status, sexuality, re-
ligion, or work—will only enrich the decision-making process.55 
 
Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence in certain areas is steeped in black conserva-
tive thought); Kendall Thomas, Reading Clarence Thomas, 18 NAT’L BLACK 
L.J. 224, 227 (2004–2005) (arguing that some of Thomas’s writings on the 
Court are personal as well as professional). 
 50. See Mark Tushnet, Clarence Thomas’s Black Nationalism, 47 HOW. 
L.J. 323 passim (2004). 
 51. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Colored Speech: Cross Burnings, Epis-
temics, and the Triumph of the Crits?, 93 GEO. L.J. 575, 608–28 (2005). 
 52. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 38 passim. 
 53. Press Release, Senator Harry Reid, Statement of Senator Harry Reid 
on the Nomination of Harriet Miers to the U.S. Supreme Court (Oct. 3, 2005), 
http://reid.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=246777; see also Molly McDonough, Har-
riet Miers’ ‘Unknown’ Story: Colleagues Cite Her Work Ethic, Integrity and 
Discretion, 4 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT (2005), http://www.abanet.org/journal/ 
ereport/oc7sct.html (noting that like Justice O’Connor, who was a state legis-
lator, Miers’s work experience in Texas may be of value to the Court). 
 54. McDonough, supra note 53; see also Lazos Vargas, supra note 34, at 
132 (citing a study of labor cases that revealed “that prior experience[s] repre-
senting management and graduation from an elite college were significant fac-
tors in predicting whether a judge would rule in favor of management”). 
 55. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Using the Master’s “Tool” to Dismantle 
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A Justice may contribute, depending on his of her or her own 
life experiences, important insights that others around them 
lack.56 In fact, Professor Sylvia Lazos Vargas relies on the rea-
soning in Grutter v. Bollinger57 to argue that diverse perspec-
tives and the value of diversity in improving learning and edu-
cation through a robust exchange of ideas apply equally to the 
judiciary.58 Just as on college and university campuses, mere 
token representation of minority groups on the Supreme Court 
will not result in a sufficient dialogue and exchange among the 
Justices, who are interpreting the very basis by which all 
Americans must live.59 Instead, “[a] critical mass is necessary 
because what is sought is a dialogic environment where dis-
agreement as to racial perspective can be freely and candidly 
expressed, forcing majority colleagues to consider perspectives 
and realities with which they are not familiar.”60 
Indeed, precisely because of the distinctive perspectives 
that nominees with differing life experiences may bring to the 
Court, diversity that reflects the make-up of the population in 
the United States would add greater legitimacy to the institu-
tion in the eyes of the public.61 Specifically, the rulings of the 
Court would carry more weight and contain greater authority if 
they were viewed as coming from a body that was comprised of 
a cross-section of the nation. Additionally, as Professor Kevin 
Johnson has noted, the inclusion of more voices of people from 
underrepresented groups on the Court “would send a powerful 
message of inclusion” to those who have traditionally been ex-
cluded from American discourse62 or, more importantly, to 
 
His House: Why Justice Clarence Thomas Makes the Case for Affirmative Ac-
tion, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 113, 135–48 (2005) (discussing the value of race diversity 
on the bench); see also Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 6, at 26 (“Give-
and-take in arguments and deliberations generally sharpens the analysis and 
affects the outcome.”). 
 56. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 55, at 143–48 (discussing Justice 
Thomas’s role in recent affirmative action cases). 
 57. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 58. Lazos Vargas, supra note 34, at 143–48. 
 59. Id. at 145–46. 
 60. Id. at 145. 
 61. See Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 6, at 28; see also Lazos 
Vargas, supra note 34, at 141 (“Inclusive judging provides a reason for minor-
ity citizens to continue to trust key governmental institutions and believe that 
they are neutral rather than political.”). 
 62. Kevin R. Johnson, On the Appointment of a Latina/o to the Supreme 
Court, 13 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 2 (2002); see also id. at 3 (“The nomination of an Af-
rican American [Thurgood Marshall] alone represented an achievement for the 
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those who have so often turned to the Court to protect their 
civil rights when elected officials failed them.63 Finally, as Pro-
fessor Ifill notes, “[D]iversity on the bench . . . encourages judi-
cial impartiality, by ensuring that a single set of values or 
views do not dominate judicial decision-making.”64 Indeed, no 
goal should be more important on the Court than ensuring im-
partiality through this balancing of differing values, views, and 
voices. For this reason, a Supreme Court that mirrors the popu-
lation of the United States in all of its diversity is essential. 
II.  DOES SIZE MATTER? 
“A necessary step to achieving a judging ethic where differ-
ing racial perspectives and realities are part of the judging 
process is garnering a critical mass of minority judges and those 
with an ‘outsider’ perspective on key benches.” 
Professor Sylvia Lazos Vargas65 
To enhance the legitimacy of the Supreme Court and to en-
sure inclusion of our nation’s diversity of moral and political 
thinking we must increase the representation of demographic 
groups on the Court. Therefore, I propose, as a thinking matter, 
that the number of Supreme Court Justices be expanded from 
nine to fifteen.66 As it currently stands, it seems difficult to cul-
 
entire African American community, unmistakably signaling that it in fact is 
an important part of the nation as a whole.”). 
 63. Lazos Vargas, supra note 34, at 102 (noting that “African Americans 
are . . . the racial group most likely to believe that the United States Supreme 
Court should serve as the guardian of civil rights for all Americans”); Joan 
Biskupic, Thomas Caught Up in Conflict: Jurist’s Court Rulings, Life Experi-
ence Are at Odds, Many Blacks Say, WASH. POST, June 7, 1996, at A20 (noting 
that Professor Stephen Carter of Yale Law School has described the Supreme 
Court as “the ultimate place that black people had been able to go to vindicate 
their rights” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 64. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models 
and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 411 (2000). Judge Posner 
echoes this point in his scholarship: 
[A] judiciary homogeneous in background, gender, ethnicity, and 
other factors that, realistically speaking, influence judgment on is-
sues of high policy would be a disaster. It would be unrepresentative, 
blind to many important issues, adrift from the general culture, quite 
possibly extreme, and on all four counts deficient in authority and 
even legitimacy. The only practical means of stabilizing law in our 
system is . . . to maintain a diverse judiciary . . . . 
POSNER, supra note 34, at 354. 
 65. Lazos Vargas, supra note 34, at 143. 
 66. I chose the number fifteen because it is the size of the International 
Court of Justice, a court on which all fifteen justices work together in reaching 
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tivate any meaningful type of demographic and substantive 
representation on the Court with just nine Justices. That low 
number combined with the rarity of openings on the Court be-
cause of lifetime appointments67 only works to deepen political 
battles and opposition to Presidential nominees to the Court.68 
The notion of “one black seat” or “two female seats” on the Su-
preme Court strengthens the likelihood of intense opposition to 
candidates, especially female and minority candidates who may 
be viewed as controversial. For example, one must wonder 
whether opposition to Justice Thomas would have been as 
strong had there also been another black “Justice Marshall” on 
the Court to counter the conservative black Justice.69 As Pro-
fessor Lazos Vargas has argued, “The lesson from Grutter is 
that to achieve a diverse judicial bench, diversity must be un-
derstood to go beyond token appointments of minority judges, 
 
decisions on cases and which is premised on a formula designed to include 
“representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal sys-
tems of the world.” Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 3, 9, June 
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1055–56, 3 Bevans 1153, 1179, 1181. One understand-
ing of the court is “that the regional distribution of seats among the Members 
of the Court should roughly parallel the regional distribution of seats on the 
Security Council.” ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT 
WORKS 45 (Terry D. Gill ed., 6th rev. ed. 2003). 
 67. 2 JOAN BISKUPIC & ELDER WITT, GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
816 (3d ed. 1997). 
 68. See Johnson, supra note 62, at 2 n.6 (“Judicial appointments often pro-
voke pitched political battles.”); Editorial, The President’s Stealth Nominee, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005, at A26 (noting how judicial selection has become 
politicized). 
 69. Blacks were very divided on the issue of Thomas’s being appointed to 
the Supreme Court. For example, the National Bar Association, the premier 
organization of black lawyers, was divided on Thomas’s nomination—128 to 
oppose, 124 to support, and 31 to take no position. See A. Leon Higginbotham, 
Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas in Retrospect, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1405, 1407 
(1995). Although traditional civil rights groups, such as the NAACP, opposed 
Thomas’s appointment to the bench, polls showed that anywhere from 50 per-
cent to 70 percent of Blacks supported Thomas’s nomination. See Suzanne P. 
Kelly, NAACP President Vows to Continue Fight for Civil Rights, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), Oct. 18, 1991, at 2B, available at 1991 WLNR 3716048; Arch 
Parsons, Thomas Issue Split Black Leaders from Grass Roots: Consequences of 
“the Gap” Being Discussed, BALT. SUN, Oct. 20, 1991, at 1G, available at 1991 
WLNR 746599; see also Peggy Peterman, Most Blacks Glad Thomas Con-
firmed, Now Want Him to Change, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 17, 1991, at 
13A, available at 1991 WLNR 1928209 (“[M]ore [black people] were for Cla-
rence Thomas than were against him, but it’s close. . . . [A] sizable number of 
black people say they simply want an African-American on the U.S. Supreme 
Court. If it’s got to be a tarnished Clarence Thomas, so be it. That’s what hap-
pens when it takes so long for a group of people, such as African-Americans, to 
get recognition.”). 
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and instead the goal should be to achieve a critical mass of mi-
nority judges . . . on [the] bench.”70 Groups, especially under-
represented groups such as Blacks would certainly have a 
greater appreciation of the diversity in viewpoint and judicial 
philosophy that a “Justice Thomas” brings if his presence did 
not necessarily signify to them the exclusion of many of their 
own voices from the bench.71 
Because of the way that tokenism currently operates, how-
ever, once one minority is on an appellate court, such as the 
Supreme Court, room is almost never made for another. Once 
one minority is on the bench, the politicians who hold the re-
sponsibility of appointing people to the bench believe their job 
is done, and they have little political incentive to create further 
diversity on that court.72 As Professor Lazos Vargas explains, 
“After ‘firsts,’ politics as usual takes over, and . . . minorities 
have not yet been able to gain a sufficient foothold in this po-
litical game” concerning appointments.73 In the end, when push 
comes to shove, it is often the expectations of racial minorities 
that are sacrificed.74 As we recently witnessed with the nomi-
nations of Harriet Miers, a white woman, and ultimately Sam-
uel Alito, a white male, to the Supreme Court as opposed to 
that of Alberto Gonzales (who while opposed by some Latino 
organizations was supported by others),75 these days suspected 
judicial philosophies win over any desire to have racial and 
ethnic diversity.76 Were the number of Justices on the Court in-
creased to fifteen, it would certainly create more room and 
fewer excuses for politicians to fail to truly account for and 
 
 70. Lazos Vargas, supra note 34, at 109. 
 71. See id. at 151 (“Battles over judicial nominations like Miguel 
Estrada’s unfold because we have settled for only a token number of minority 
judges on key benches. . . . The politics of judicial diversity appointments are 
vicious because once a minority judge is named to a highly visible bench, it is 
unlikely that another minority judge will subsequently be appointed.”). 
 72. See id. at 148–51. 
 73. Id. at 149. 
 74. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523–24 (1980) (describing the 
principle of interest convergence, in which the rights of blacks are always sac-
rificed whenever they conflict with white interests). 
 75. See Fletcher & Balz, supra note 17; see also Lazos Vargas, supra note 
34, at 150–51 (describing the same split within the Latino/Latina community 
over Miguel Estrada’s nomination to the D.C. Circuit). 
 76. Coyle, supra note 37 (quoting Professor Sheldon Goldman of the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts–Amherst as stating that “[f ]or Bush, diversity is very 
important but ideology trumps diversity” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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value diversity in their nominations and votes. This is not to 
say that increasing the number of Justices on the Court will 
guarantee diversity, just that it would make the possibility of 
such diversity greater despite politics. As it currently stands, 
we are so wedded to this notion of which seat is a woman’s seat 
versus a minority seat, that it is hard for politicians to envision 
seats other than those already filled by women and minorities 
as seats suitable for minority or female nominees. There ap-
pears to be a tipping point at which minorities and women are 
no longer considered.77 One must wonder if it were Justice 
Scalia who was retiring rather than Justice O’Connor whether 
there would have been any mention at all of diversity—of filling 
his vacancy with a woman or minority. Adding new seats to the 
Court would help to alleviate this problem. To the extent there 
is a tipping point, appointing the second racial minority to the 
tenth seat on the Court is likely to look and feel different than 
appointing the second racial minority to the ninth seat. 
Furthermore, little in history indicates that the choice to 
have nine Justices on the Supreme Court is inflexible. Indeed, 
all factors indicate that the selection of the number nine for the 
size of the Court is more of a historical accident than a reflec-
tion of any conscious decision that nine was the right number 
for decision making. 
The number of Supreme Court Justices at any given time 
has ranged from five to ten.78 First, the number of Justices on 
the Court began at six as mandated by the Judiciary Act of 
1789.79 A few years later, political battles resulted in the pas-
sage of the Circuit Court Act of 1801, which reduced that num-
ber from six to five.80 The very next year, Congress repealed the 
1801 Act, reestablishing the number of Supreme Court Justices 
at six.81 Because of increasing work on the Court for the Jus- 
 
 
 77. DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR 
RACIAL JUSTICE 140–161 (1987) (analyzing the tipping point at which no more 
minority faculty would be hired on a predominantly white faculty); Richard 
Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roadmap: Is the Marketplace Theory for Eradicating Dis-
crimination a Blind Alley?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 215, 226–31 (1998) (analyzing a 
similar scenario regarding residential segregation). 
 78. BISKUPIC & WITT, supra note 67, at 816–17. 
 79. Id. at 816. 
 80. Id. (noting that the Circuit Court Act was intended to prevent the 
newly elected president at the time, Thomas Jefferson, from filling any vacan-
cies on the Supreme Court). 
 81. Id. 
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tices, especially greater burdens caused by growing circuit du-
ties as new circuits were added, Congress enacted the Judiciary 
Act of 1807, which increased the number of Justices from six to 
seven.82 In 1837, two more seats were added, creating nine 
seats on the Supreme Court.83 In 1863, Congress passed more 
legislation increasing the number of Justices to ten.84 Three 
years later in 1866, political tensions again played a role in the 
structure of the Court, cutting its size down to seven because of 
a desire to prevent President Andrew Johnson from appointing 
people who would “represent” his views about the unconstitu-
tionality of Reconstruction legislation.85 
The last adjustment to the Court size would come another 
three years later, with an increase from seven to nine Justices 
through the Judiciary Act of 1869.86 The Act provided: “[T]he 
Supreme Court of the United States shall hereafter consist of 
the Chief Justice of the United States and eight associate jus-
tices, any six of whom shall constitute a quorum . . . .”87 Ever 
since, the size of the Court has remained at nine.88 But such 
permanence did not come without effort. In 1937, President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt tried to pack the Court with Jus-
tices who would be sympathetic to his New Deal legislative 
proposals.89 
In sum, there are no apparent reasons for not increasing 
the number of Justices on the Supreme Court. Some criticisms 
about the size of the Court came in 1937 from several Justices 
themselves, who declared the following in opposition to Presi-
dent Roosevelt’s “court-packing” plan: 
“[A] Court of nine is as large a court as is manageable. The Court 
could do its work, except for writing of the opinions, a good deal better 
if it were five rather than nine. Every man who is added to the Court 
adds another voice in counsel, and the most difficult work of the 
Court . . . is that that [sic] is done around the counsel table; and if you 
make the Court a convention instead of a small body of experts, you 
 
 82. Id. at 816–17. 
 83. Id. at 816. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.; see also Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court 
Reform, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1154, 1162 & n.31 (2006) (discussing fluctuations in 
the size of the Court during Reconstruction). 
 86. BISKUPIC & WITT, supra note 67, at 816. 
 87. Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 1, 16 Stat. 44, 44. 
 88. BISKUPIC & WITT, supra note 67, at 816. 
 89. Id. at 817; see also Vermeule, supra note 85, at 1156 (outlining Roose-
velt’s court-packing plan). 
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will simply confuse counsel. It will confuse counsel within the Court, 
and will cloud the work of the Court and deteriorate and degenerate 
it.”90 
Although increasing the size of the Court to fifteen may 
make it more difficult to reach majority decisions and build 
consensus, especially given the complexity of the cases the Su-
preme Court decides to review, such factors should not serve as 
a barrier to providing the full range of voices that can be repre-
sented on a larger Court. To my mind, the benefits of increased 
participation on the Supreme Court—such as greater legiti-
macy, a stronger dialogue between Justices, and the inclusion 
of a broader range of values and voices—far outweigh the nega-
tives. Furthermore, there is precedent for such large decision-
making judicial bodies on difficult legal issues in circuit court 
en-banc hearings.91 
Although en banc review does not come without its criti-
cisms,92 most of these critiques are irrelevant when applied to 
the Supreme Court, which unlike en banc courts, consists of 
Justices who regularly work together in deliberating on and de-
ciding cases. Arguments against the use of en banc proceedings 
include notions that such proceedings: (1) detract from the effi-
ciency of appellate courts’ decision making by requiring all the 
circuit judges to engage in, on top of all their usual work, an-
other round of written and oral arguments and deliberations; 
(2) undermine the finality of three-judge panel decisions; (3) 
displace resources that would otherwise be applied to non–en 
banc cases; (4) allow a politicized majority to abuse the process 
in a way that is designed to advance their own ideologies; (5) 
 
 90. BISKUPIC & WITT, supra note 67, at 817 (quoting Charles Evans 
Hughes’s letter to Congress dated March 21, 1937) (omission in original). 
 91. See 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (2000) (encoding the number of circuit judges on 
each of the several circuits); id. § 46(c) (specifying the number of circuit judges 
who sit during en banc review); FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) (determining when a 
hearing or rehearing en banc may be ordered); Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. 
Comm’r, 314 U.S. 326, 335 (1941) (upholding the right of circuit courts to con-
duct en banc rehearings of prior three-judge panel decisions). 
 92.  See, e.g., Irving R. Kaufman, Do the Costs of the En Banc Proceeding 
Outweigh Its Advantages?, 69 JUDICATURE 7, 7 (1985) (“It is axiomatic that 
three judges, in an intimate conference, will find the heart of a case more 
quickly than will eleven.”). En banc review is also not favored by the Federal 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) (“An en banc hearing or 
rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered . . . .”); see also Mi-
chael E. Solimine, Ideology and En Banc Review, 67 N.C. L. REV. 29, 29–30 
(1988) (explaining that en banc reviews comprise less than 1 percent of cases 
decided on the merits). 
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result in fragmented, ambiguous opinions from the court; and 
(6) increase the difficulty of decision making among judges by 
increasing the number of arbiters involved in any decision.93 
Unlike with circuit courts, however, an increase in the 
number of Justices on the Supreme Court would not negatively 
influence the Court by causing additional burdens of work, dis-
placement of resources, or political abuses by majorities who 
can vote to come together to hear a case and advance their 
views. Unlike for federal appellate courts, merely increasing 
the number of Justices does not require any additional hear-
ings that may divert attention from the usual work of the Su-
preme Court, nor does it create any further potential for ideo-
logical majorities to hold special hearings to advance their 
interpretations of the law. As Professor Michael Solimine has 
explained, “[T]he Supreme Court always sits en banc.”94 Fur-
thermore, unlike decisions before circuit courts, the finality of 
decisions before the Supreme Court would not be disturbed by 
the implementation of my proposal to enlarge the Court. After 
all, the Supreme Court is the final word on matters before the 
judiciary. 
Even those criticisms of en banc review that apply to the 
Supreme Court do not present any serious concerns to my pro-
posal for enlarging the Court. While it is true that having a 
greater number of Justices on the Supreme Court may result in 
more frequent authoring of concurring and dissenting opin-
ions—and thus may result in more “ambiguous” decisions from 
the Court—these factors pose less risk of having any substan-
tial effect on the Supreme Court than on circuit courts. First, 
because Supreme Court Justices have lifetime appointments 
and regularly work together to decide cases, they are unlike an 
en banc court that meets infrequently and are much more 
skilled at accommodating each other’s views in their work. This 
argument is supported by the findings of Professors Lewis 
Kornhauser and Lawrence Sager, who contend that “multi-
judge courts are quite capable of behaving consistently. If each 
judge on a court acts consistently from case to case, so too will 
the court that they constitute.”95 Second, unlike three-judge 
 
 93. See Solimine, supra note 92, at 30, 32, 38–39; Michael Ashley Stein, 
Uniformity in the Federal Courts: A Proposal for Increasing the Use of En Banc 
Appellate Review, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 805, 829–51 (1993). 
 94. Solimine, supra note 92, at 49. 
 95. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 
YALE L.J. 82, 83 (1986). 
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panel circuit decisions, the drafting of concurrences and dis-
sents for Supreme Court cases is already a widespread practice 
and thus presents no real difference to the Court’s usual 
method of resolving cases. Although I realize that there are 
concerns about the number of separate opinions written by Jus-
tices on the Court, I am not convinced that the authoring of 
these separate opinions is a serious cause for concern in every 
case. To the extent that these separate opinions ensure the in-
clusion of another voice, their existence is surely a positive. Ad-
ditionally, as Professor Michael Stein has argued, 
Because multiple opinions generally make individual judges’ positions 
on specific issues more readily comprehensible and predictable . . . 
they add “considerable rationality, continuity, and legitimacy to the 
decision making process.” This is especially true of dissenting opin-
ions . . . . Consequently, “[s]ome of our greatest jurisprudence has 
been introduced into the law in the form of dissents and expressions 
of minority views.”96 
Moreover, while decisions by a fifteen-member Court may 
lead to more “vague” decisions as a result of the need to build a 
consensus among a larger number of Justices, it will also cer-
tainly lead, if principles of diversity are kept in mind, to the in-
clusion of a broader range of voices in the decision. If this “diffi-
culty” in achieving uniformity in decisions is the price we must 
pay as the result of a larger Court, then that price is certainly 
worth what we would gain through greater inclusion of voices 
and increased legitimacy of the Court in the eyes of the public. 
Indeed, one of the benefits of an en banc court is that it “per-
mit[s] the full complement of judges to pass on cases of excep-
tional importance.”97 And, Supreme Court cases are, by defini-
tion, of exceptional importance. Increasing the number of 
Justices to allow a full complement of voices across the United 
States to be represented in that process can only work to better 
the decision-making process. As many scholars have argued, 
“the involvement and interaction of more judges leads to 
sounder decisions.”98 In fact, Professors Kornhauser and Sager 
contend that “enlarging the number of judges who sit on a court 
can be expected to improve the court’s performance.”99 Fur-
thermore, just as “an en banc decision is assumed to command 
 
 96. Stein, supra note 93, at 840–41 (citations omitted). 
 97. Solimine, supra note 92, at 39 (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 98. Id. at 40. 
 99. Kornhauser and Sager, supra note 95, at 83. 
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greater authority and compliance, since it is not simply the 
product of a three-judge panel,”100 a Supreme Court decision 
will command greater legitimacy if it is not simply the product 
of a narrow set of Justices with like racial, class, gender, work, 
sexuality, and religious backgrounds. 
Finally, because I recognize that appointing six Justices at 
one time by one President may lead to other types of diversity 
but not necessarily diversity in general ideology, I recommend 
that this proposed increase in the size of the Court be phased 
in, with each addition requiring a supermajority approval by 
Congress. In other words, I believe that these concerns of diver-
sity should be considered and worked toward over time and 
with much care. Specifically, I recommend that two Justices be 
appointed to the bench every three years until the Court 
reaches the size of fifteen. Thereafter, we could return to our 
present practice of filling in openings as Justices retire from 
their lifetime term. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, I believe that diversity matters very much 
on the Court and increasing the size of the Court may be a 
means of helping to create true diversity, not just tokenism. As 
we have seen during the tenure of Justices Marshall, O’Connor, 
Thomas, and even majority Justices—who as a result of having 
their privileged status, are viewed as being nonraced, non-
gendered, and uninfluenced by background—one’s life experi-
ences certainly affect one’s judicial philosophy. 
At the same time, however, I recognize that even similar 
backgrounds due to race, religion, gender, and other factors 
may themselves result in different voices among Justices 
within their own small communities.101 But our experience 
with the judiciary leads me to believe that a higher number of 
differing voices on the bench will lead, not only to better deci-
sion making, but also to greater appreciation and acceptance 
during the appointment process of the full range of voices that 
may exist within different marginalized communities—that is, 
if tokenism is not continued in a way that excludes certain un-
derrepresented voices at the expense of others.102 Finally, a di-
 
 100. Solimine, supra note 92, at 40. 
 101. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 55, at 148–53 (describing differences 
in the judicial thinking of Justices Marshall and Thomas). 
 102. Cf. Coyle, supra note 37 (“‘[I]t’s not the case that Latino activists 
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verse, “representative” Court would signal to all members of so-
ciety that their voices not only matter but are critical to the 
process of justice and fairness.103 
In essence, this proposal is not just about the physi-
cal/descriptive representation over substantive representation. 
For the Court to increase its legitimacy and effectiveness, it is 
necessary to have a broad and fully inclusive range of voices on 
the bench.104 As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg made clear while 
commenting on the open position that had been left by Justice 
O’Connor, it is not so much the physical representation itself 
that is important, but the representation of voice.105 Increasing 
the number of Supreme Court Justices from nine to fifteen is a 
sound and workable way to achieve that goal. 
 
groups are going to oppose all conservative Latino nominees. If a conservative 
is in the mainstream, they will support a Latino because of the benefits of add-
ing diversity to the court.’” (quoting Kevin R. Johnson, Associate Dean and 
Public Interest Professor of Law and Chicana/o Studies at the University of 
California–Davis School of Law)). 
 103. Johnson, supra note 62, at 12 (indicating that “the appointment of a 
Latina/o to the Supreme Court would signal a movement toward full member-
ship for Latina/os in American social life”). 
 104. Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 6, at 27, 49–51 (noting that “a 
‘critical mass’ of minority group members serving on the bench would be more 
likely to transform the Court toward a more sophisticated understanding of 
race and racism”). 
 105. Nahal Toosi, Ginsburg: ‘Any Woman Will Not Do’ for Job, ABCNEWS 
.COM, Sept. 21, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=1147816. 
Justice Ginsburg proclaimed, “[A]ny woman will not do . . . . [There are] some 
women who might be appointed who would not advance human rights or 
women’s rights . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
